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It’s customary to consider the rise of Nigel Farage as the product of a conniving, deliberate and relentless strategy. But the Reform leader’s political trajectory: from fringe eurosceptic to one-man vanguard, forging an epochal reconstitution of British politics, only looks irresistible in hindsight.
In large part, Farage’s success can be chalked up to his ability — far in excess of his political adversaries — to exploit moments. His instinctive opportunism, sense of timing and suspenseful theatrics have all been deployed, savagely and single-mindedly, to manipulate his opponent’s vulnerabilities.
Like any adept populist, therefore, Farage has a playbook. But even that can be plied and stretched to address novel circumstance.
The approach (not a strategy per se) was epitomised by his indecision over whether to contest the general election. In May, Rishi Sunak planned to steal a march on Farage by dissolving parliament months ahead of Westminster’s collective expectations. But the very scheme misunderstood the then-Reform honorary president’s politics and appeal. In the chaos of the sudden campaign, Sunak had carved for Farage an ideal moment.
For Farage, the audacious authenticity of appearing to stand for election on a whim undermined, in an instant, months of careful Conservative plotting. The threat Reform posed Sunak now consumed the campaign’s discourse as Tory spokespeople stumbled ineptly if inevitably to their fate.
In his pre-parliament days, the Farage playbook was energised, ironically, by his aloof relationship with power. Unlike an under-pressure PM or opposition leader, Farage was only conspicuous at moments of his choosing — typically at the head of some “special” presser or pursuing some culture war side quest in the GB News studio. (Or courting popular favour in the I’m a Celeb jungle).
That changed on 5th July when Farage was elected as an MP on his seventh attempt.
On the green benches of the House of Commons, Farage has effectively lost control of his most potent strength: his sense of timing and suspense. He will only chime in when Mr Speaker so pleases, and it is well within the government’s right to engage with sparing enthusiasm. Simultaneously, the Reform leader must proffer a response to every shock development in whatever Whitehall department. That potentially uproots another of Farage’s defining strengths: his vague positioning that licensed voters to project their frustrations and chosen solutions onto him.
Proximity to power, in short, has forced Farage to become genuinely strategic.
In 2024, Reform smashed political ceilings UKIP barely scratched; now, it is expanding its operations and ambitions. Locally, constituency Reform organisations are proliferating. Centrally, new party chair Zia Yusuf has adopted new in-house vetting procedures.
The approach reflects the more focused, disciplined mode of populism that powered Donald Trump’s resurgence in the US — a portentous comparison.
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Nigel Farage’s missions, next steps and milestones
For any populist, success is the currency of credibility. It both emboldens the movement and signals to opponents that a siege is steadily, inexorably building. In this regard, Farage will derive significant strength from the procession of electoral milestones that plot the path to parliament’s scheduled dissolution in 2029.
In a recent press conference, Farage proclaimed with glee that the “vast majority” of his time is focused on English county council elections in May next year. He cited plans to field 2,200 candidates and told attendees that Yusuf has so far “vetted and approved over 1000 of them”.
Farage seemed almost shocked as he added: “We’re taking this seriously”.
Then, in May 2026, elections to the Senedd in Wales will be held under a new and completely proportionate system, where voters will pick an expanded cohort of 96 members via party lists. Reform won none of the 32 Welsh Westminster seats in July, but came second in thirteen. It also achieved 16.9 per cent of the vote — just 1.3 points behind the Conservatives on 18.2 per cent.
At the same time, voters in Scotland will elect new MSPs at Holyrood according to its additional member system; this too, could solve some of the problems associated with Reform’s inefficiently distributed support. Reform took 7 per cent of the vote in Scotland at July’s general election, leapfrogging the Conservatives in 25 seats. That is despite Farage’s decision not to campaign in the country on the grounds of “safety and security”.
And consider Farage’s potential by-election opportunities, including in Mike Amesbury’s Runcorn and Helsby constituency. Reform finished (a distant) second there in July.
But winning these contests will not be Farage’s initial aim. Addressing the Reform press conference last week, Farage insisted his party will soon “replace the Conservatives as the main opposition”. In parliamentary terms, Farage needs a whole host of by-elections to officially emerge as the leader of His Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition. But politics does not operate solely in parliamentary terms.
As Conservative Party leader, Kemi Badenoch has the privilege of interrogating the prime minister every Wednesday afternoon. And yet Farage can probably corral more support with a single TikTok (addressed to his one million followers) than Badenoch with her six scattergun PMQs. The bottom line is this: even before the English council elections, when Reform could evince serious strides, Farage is a far more visible (and effective) critic of the Labour government than Badenoch, the de jure opposition chief.
All this matters because of the broader picture: Reform’s strong poll performances, Farage’s pointed interventions and possible “mid-term” election triumphs could, in time, precipitate a point of seismic political significance.
Opinion polls aside, the true Reform-Tory “crossover” will arrive when Farage’s rise, and the Conservative Party’s co-equal decline, fundamentally re-shape our assumptions of how politics is conducted in Britain. Think ahead to the psychological watershed as Westminster, slowly then abruptly, treats Reform not just as a permanent fixture in the UK political landscape — but a or the future of the British right.
Suffice it to say, this hypothetical but increasingly conceivable scenario would trigger all kinds of tumult for the Tory leadership.
In those constituencies it hasn’t already, the logic of first past the post (FPTP) would flip. Rishi Sunak’s single riposte to Reform during the election exploited fears of “wasted votes” and a Labour “supermajority”. In 2029, at a time of wanton electoral chaos — characterised by a panoply of legitimate options and voters’ willingness to consider them — who is to say what votes are “wasted”, and where? In any case, Reform finished second in 98 constituencies last election. Across those fiefdoms and the “Red Wall” in particular, Farage would take great pleasure in denouncing Tory candidates as spoilers.
Meanwhile, former Conservative MPs seeking a route back to frontline politics could reevaluate their options and conclude Reform provides the clearest path. This point reflects a disturbing truth for those of a Tory persuasion: the Conservative Party’s “replacement” by Reform may well have already begun.
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Sunak’s moment of maximum danger may still await — the Reform-Conservative crossover
Last month, it was announced that Andrea Jenkyns, a former Tory MP and minister, will stand as Reform’s candidate for the newly created Mayor of Greater Lincolnshire post in the 2025 local elections. The move was not, in and of itself, of supreme political significance. Then this week, the founding editor of ConservativeHome, Tim Montgomerie, was unveiled as Reform’s latest recruit.
But it was Reform chief whip Lee Anderson who blazed this particular trail. In hindsight, Anderson’s defection to Reform UK in March of this year was the ultimate act of political self-preservation. As Red Wall Tories succumbed to their fate last parliament, anchored to Sunak’s Tory Titanic, Anderson put himself forward as the first piece in Reform’s new Ship of Theseus — the ultimate “replacement” strategy.
Since Anderson, every raven that’s fled the tower has served as a symbol of Reform’s escalating influence. Today, following the general election in July, Farage has a pool of 175 former Conservative MPs to attract to Reform — including the length and breadth of the Tory Red Wall collective. Of course, the vast majority of those 175 wouldn’t dream of partnering with Farage. But a critical minority no doubt would, if they resolve that the treacherous liaison could develop or rejuvenate their political career.
This all begs a question: can Badenoch thwart, or undo, the process of Tory-Reform replacement this parliament?
Ultimate success for the Conservative leader would involve winning back a large proportion of the former Tory voters who threw in with Farage in July; and, perhaps more pressingly, preventing further such seepage — either by countering Farage’s calls or proffering a positive pro-Tory vision.
And yet the electoral threat Reform’s parliamentary “bridgehead” poses after fourteen years of Conservative government is broad and not obviously perishable. At a time of heightened anti-political sentiment and demographic pressure on Conservative politics, Reform is no mere receptacle for “disgruntled” Tories — but a new home on the right for betrayed voters, or those otherwise scornful, willing to countenance the destruction of the party.
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Accordingly, Conservative voters may have slipped towards Reform with relative ease this year. But these same voters may be rather less elastic when it comes to the journey back. The Rubicon, for some at least, will have been crossed as soon as their ballot was marked for Farage.
Everything we know about Kemi Badenoch and her politics suggests she will not respond well to setbacks — of which there could be many, in the form of the aforementioned electoral milestones, by 2029. In some extreme eventualities, the pressure on Badenoch will increase — defection by defection, by-election by by-election — until it becomes politically intolerable. If it becomes obvious that Badenoch has failed to stem the Reform insurgency, what Conservative instinct kicks in then? What tumult is then triggered?
The die for this parliament is not yet cast. But at this critical juncture, Reform has far better recourse to boost its ratings than Badenoch has to quash them. Indeed, it isn’t clear what levers Badenoch has at her disposal that could restrain Reform’s momentum. And beyond Badenoch, what Conservative politician exists that could plausibly appeal to those disillusioned and downtrodden (often ex-Tory) voters Farage is courting this parliament?
In time then, perhaps we will need to consider a longer-term threat to Keir Starmer and Labour: that there will be no split on the right in general elections beyond 2029. Reform and Nigel Farage, or some Reformed Conservative Party, will be the right.
Josh Self is Editor of Politics.co.uk, follow him on Bluesky here.
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Reform takeover: how the Conservative Party could fall into the clutches of Nigel Farage
