Congressman Greg Meeks Wants Answers On The Text Message War Plan

By April Ryan

“I am immediately calling on Chairman Mast to hold a hearing on what might be the most astonishing breach of our national security in recent history,” says New York Congressman Greg Meeks. The ranking House Foreign Affairs committee chair is addressing the reported revelation that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Vice President J.D. Vance, and others used the encrypted phone app Signal to map out a war plan against the Houthis that took place on March 15. A reporter from the Atlantic was accidentally pulled into the encrypted Signal text chain conversation with high-ranking Trump officials. Once the March 15th attack happened, the reporter realized this was not a hoax and subsequently wrote a story titled “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans.”

Hegseth is working to discredit the reporter the high-ranking Trump officials accidentally included in the text chain during the Signal conversation he was privy to. The new Defense Secretary told reporters yesterday, “Nobody was texting war plans…” Meanwhile, as the Trump officials allegedly used the Signal phone app for this war plan, they were supposed to follow long-standing national security protocol and use a secure site that would not allow eavesdropping. One of those places happened to be the Situation Room in the White House, which was created specifically for instances like this. That room has been used for many military missions to include the demise of Osama Bin Laden, the mastermind behind the 9-11 attacks. In the meantime, elected officials want answers to a myriad of questions about this national security breach. Congressman Meeks has drafted and sent a letter to Secretary Hegseth awaiting answers to questions.

Here is a portion of the letter from Congressman Meeks to Secretary Hegseth.

In the interest of congressional oversight, we request answers to the following questions:

1. Was information regarding U.S. military activities against the Houthis on or about March 15, 2025, disclosed via the Signal messaging service by any National Security Council principal? If so, by whom and what specific information was disclosed?
2. In how many instances has the National Security Council held discussions on national security matters involving Principals Committee members or any other relevant executive branch officials using the Signal messaging service or any other messaging service application that has not been approved for the transmission of classified information? In each instance, please describe the specific national security matter or matters that were discussed.
3. Was classified information shared in the instance reported by The Atlantic or in any other instance described in reply to the previous question?
4. Was unclassified but highly sensitive information shared in any such instance?
5. Was information shared in any such instance that could have compromised the operational security of any military activities?
6. Was information shared in any such instance that could have compromised the safety of members of the U.S. armed forces or those of a U.S. ally or partner?
7. Was information shared in any such instance that could have compromised any of the capabilities of the U.S. armed forces or those of a U.S. ally or partner?
8. What measures has the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the intelligence community taken to ensure that the discourse of any such instance and any other discourse involving national security matters via an electronic messaging service are preserved by applicable federal record-keeping law?
9. If classified or any other sensitive information was disclosed via the Signal messaging service, what measures have been put into place by the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community to ensure that it will not occur again?

We appreciate your attention to these questions and look forward to your prompt replies.